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on the person in charge of the corporation's office will not invalidate the
service.
In Sours v. State ° the same members of the Supreme Court of Ohio
held an attempted residence service invalid when the summons was left
in a place where the defendant could not reasonably have been expected
to find it. In that decision the court stated in dictum that ". . . where, if
the provisions of the statute are strictly followed, it is reasonably probable
that the person so served will receive the notice, the fact that in some
instances the person does not actually receive that notice does not in-
validate the service."" This line of reasoning would imply that valid
service can be obtained by compliance with the procedure and requisites
set out in the service statute regardless of whether there is actual notice.
If Ohio courts should follow this reasoning in cases where the sheriff
serves a non-employee, who fails to bring such summons to the attention
of the chief or subordinate officers of the defendant corporation, will not
the corporation be subjected to an undue burden?
Though the Moriarty decision can be defended in the light of the
corporation's receipt of actual notice of the summons, it is difficult to dis-
cern whether the court defined valid service in terms of statutory com-
pliance or in terms of actual notice. Because the court found it necessary
to invoke both theories the law remains uncertain.
WORTH A. FAUVER, JR.
PERSONAL PROPERTY - GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS IN OHIO
Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E.2d 126 (1961)
The donor, during his last illness, gave a check for $6000 issued
by the Ohio Industrial Commission and endorsed by him to the defend-
ants and instructed the defendants to hold the check for his seven children
until his death. If the donor survived the illness, the check was to be
returned. Upon hearing of the donor's death, the defendants deposited
the check in their own account and later made disbursements.
July 9, 1958, the plaintiff, administratrix of the donor's estate,
filed for a declaratory judgment in the Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County against the defendants to determine the ownership of the In-
dustrial Commission check. After a hearing, the probate court entered
judgment for the plaintiff,' and this judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.' The defendants appealed to the Ohio
Supreme Court on three theories: first, that the donor had established
10. 172 Ohio St. 242, 175 N.E.2d 77 (1961).
11. Id. at 244, 175 N.E.2d at 78.
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a revocable inter vivos trust, which became irrevocable upon the death
of the settlor;3 second, that the defendants had an attorney's lien on the
check;' and finally, that the donor effected a valid gift causa mortis
to the defendants for the donees. The attention of this article is directed
to the latter issue - the theory of gift causa mortis.5
From the testimony in the Adams case, two opposing inferences
emerged. Certain parts of the testimony indicated that the title to the
check was to vest at the moment of delivery. Other parts indicated that
the donor did not intend the gift to vest in the donees until his death.'
Thus, the evidence that the donor intended to part with his interest in
the property before his death was not found to be clear and convincing.
This ineffective delivery was held to have resulted in a testamentary
disposition rather than a gift.
The Ohio Supreme Court has not favored gifts causa mortis because
of their similarity to legacies, which are provided for in the statute of wills
and laws of descent and distribution.7 Yet gifts causa mortis are in
1. The conclusions of law found by the probate court were that the donor did not effect a
gift, that there was no agency power coupled with an interest, and that the defendants were
bailees or custodians of the check. The court also found that the $6000 check vested in the
donor's estate immediately upon his death. Adams v. Fleck, 80 Ohio L Abs. 48 (P. Ct. 1958).
2. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 453, 172 N.E.2d 126, 128 (1961).
3. In rejecting the trust theory, the court held that in the present case the evidence neither
clearly nor convincingly established the existence or terms of the purported trust. The court
stated that any trust enabling the donor to exercise substantial dominion and control over
the trust property must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The purported trust
was a revocable inter vivos trust under which the settlor could retain the income and the right
to have the trust property returned. The court refused to decide whether there ever could be
sufficient evidence to justify recognition of the validity of such a trust, in the absence of a
formal agreement.
In Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Company, 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 NXE.2d 60 (1961), the Ohio
Supreme Court held valid as against the widow's statutory right to take against the will a formal
inter vivos trust, the terms of which allowed the settlor to reserve to himself the income
for life and an absolute power to revoke the trust in whole or in part, as well as the right
to modify terms of settlement and to control investments. See also discussion in Trusts
section, p. 538 infra.
4. The court observed that since the administratrix had placed in controversy the attorney's
fees arising from the settlement of a claim against the Industrial Commission, the Commission
should determine the amount of the fees pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 4123.06 and
that the defendants could not have an attorney's lien to an amount they might determine
without regard to the Commission's determination. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio Sr. 451, 459-60,
172 N.E.2d 126, 132 (1961). See also discussion in Workmen's Compensation section,
p. 551 infra.
5. "MIThe essential attributes of a gift causa mortis are: (1) It must be of personal
property; (2) the gift must be made in the last illness of the donor.., under the apprehen-
sion of [imminent] death .... and subject to the implied condition that if the donor recover
from the illness, or if the donee die first, the gift shall be void; and (3) possession of the prop-
erty given must be delivered at the time of gift to the donee, or to some one for him, and the
gift must be accepted by the donee." Johnson v. Colley, 101 Va. 414, 416, 44 S.E. 721, 722
(1903). See BROWN, PERsONAL PROPERTY 5 51 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 455, 172 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1961).
7. Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St. 462, 3 N.E. 532 (1885). The court held that the laws relating
to written and nuncupative wills should not be defeated, except in clear cases of gifts causa
mortis.
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theory distinct from testamentary dispositions, wherein title remains
vested in the donor until his death. Gifts causa mortis take effect in
praesenti with a complete surrender of all dominion and control over the
property;' while title thereto is subject to divestment upon the donor's
recovery, or his revocation of the gift.' Therefore, in Adams v. Fleck,"0
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the attempted gift causa moris
lacked this essential classical requirement, in that the evidence was not
sufficiently clear and convincing to show tide to the gift was to vest in
the donees before the donor's death.
While, on the one hand, the court in the Adams case emphasized that,
as exceptions to the statute of wills, gifts causa mortis are contrary to the
policy of the law," on the other hand, it did not emphasize effectuation
of the donor's manifest intent to make a valid disposition of personal
property. The degree of emphasis with which evidence of the donor's
intent should be considered in cases of property disposition was expressed
by another court:
[I]t is the duty of courts to enforce all lawful rights, so as to carry
out the intention of the parties. That intention should always be ob-
served if lawfully expressed; and it is only incumbent on legal tribunals
to be very careful to ascertain the facts. There is much room for frauds
and mistakes in cases of this kind, and, therefore, care should be used
to sift the evidence. But where there is no doubt about the facts, it
would be a legal wrong and gross injustice to refuse to act upon them
fairly and without hesitation.12
There is no doubt that gifts causa mortis are exceptions to the stat-
ute of wills. They permit a disposition of property after death without
the safeguards and formalities of a will. Even so, gifts causa mortis can
be justified by the letter and spirit of the law. As one writer put it:
Under a legal system recognizing the individualistic institution of
private property and granting to the owner the power to determine his
8. One court declared that "to constitute such a gift, there must be ... a complete surren-
der of all dominion and control over the property, effected by an absolute delivery, subject
only to the condition that delivery to the donee not be made until the death of the donor."
Koehler v. Koehler, 113 Ohio App. 192, 194, 171 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1960). Wisconsin appar-
ently is the only state that does not make a distinction with regard to vesting of title before or
after the donor's death. Title may vest in the donee either before or after the donor's death.
Nol's Estate, 251 Wis. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360 (1952).
9. "(S]ome quasi-testamentary acts, - such as gifts causa mortis, where delivery takes the
place of the execution of a will, - may even enable essentially testamentary dispositions to be
effected without compliance with the statutes governing wills. To be sure the delivery, actual
or symbolic as the case may be, marks a gift causa mnortis off from a strict testamentary dis-
position, but the revocable nature of the gift makes that distinction very slight, and in those
jurisdictions where the title to the thing delivered as a gift causa mortis does not pass until
the donor dies, the distinction becomes microscopic. Nevertheless the distinction is well estab-
lished." Costigan, Constructive Trusts, 28 HARv. L. REV. 237, 240-41 (1915).
10. 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E.2d 126 (1961).
11. Id. at 454, 172 N.E.2d at 129.
12. Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 187 (1875).
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successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should
favor giving effect to an intentional exercise of this power. s
When the majority of American courts sustain gifts causa mortis, they
are giving effect to this right and power.
The weight of American authority 4 supports the court's proposition
that there can be no valid gift causa mortis if the death of the donor was
a condition precedent to the vesting of title in a third party for the donee,
or in the donee himself. In the Adams case death was a condition
precedent to the vesting of tide of the check in the donees.
Ohio, with the majority of American courts, realizes the inherent
possibility of fraud in gifts causa morris.' 5 A few courts are liberal in
their requirement,"8 but all demand clear and convincing evidence to
support gifts causa mortis.' New Hampshire, for example, requires two
disinterested parties to witness such gifts.'" Once the donor has mani-
fested an intent to make a gift and effects a valid delivery, most courts
subsequently sustain the gifts. 9 Ohio has held that they should not
ordinarily be sustained except in a very dear case."0
In the Adams case the Ohio Supreme Court for the first time ex-
pressed doubt as to the validity of gifts causa mortis in Ohio law.
It may be observed that, although this court has sometimes considered
... whether certain facts were sufficient to establish a gift causa mortis,
this court has never actually held in a case reported with an opinion that
there can be that kind of a gift under the law of this state l
13. Gulliver & Tilson, Classificaion of Gratituitious Transfers, 51 YALE IJ. 1, 2 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Basket v. Hassell, 107 U.S. 500 (1882); Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.Y. 572, 26
N-E. 627 (1891); Mackenzie v. Steeves, 98 Wash. 17, 167 Pac. 50 (1917). See BROWN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 53 (2d ed. 1955).
15. For the Ohio view, see Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St. 462, 3 N.E. 532 (1885). For cases
in other states see, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Collinson, 231 Ind. 360, 108 NXE.2d 700
(1952); Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S.W. 757 (1910);
Begovich v. Kruljac, 38 Wyo. 365, 267 Pac. 426 (1928). See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 56 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Puscash v. Dry Dock Say. Institution, 140 Misc. 579, 251 N.Y. Supp. 184 (N.Y. City Ct.
1931). A donee took actual possession of a bankbook the day after the donor's death. As the
donor's intent to constructively deliver the bankbook a day earlier was proved, the court held
that it was a valid gift causa mortis. Accord, Nols Estate, 251 Wis. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360
(1952).
17. Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St. 462, 3 N.. 532 (1885); In the Matter of Estate of Collinson,
321 Ind. 360, 108 N.E.2d 700 (1952); Gambill v. Hogan, 30 Tenn. App. 458, 207 S.W.2d
356 (1947).
18. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:17 (1955).
19. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 56 (2d ed. 1955). Gifts causa morris have been
approved by statute in four states. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1149-53; GA. CODE ANN. § 48-201
(1937); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 67-1709-13 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-1109-13
(1947).
20. Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108, 12 NE. 321 (1887); Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St.
462, 3 NE. 532 (1885); Van Pelt v. King, 22 Ohio App. 295, 154 N.E. 163 (1926); In re
Meyers, 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 57 (1925).
21. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 456, 172 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1961).
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Of the alleged gift causa mortis cases which have passed before it, the
supreme court has sustained two: South v. Fair22 and Galbraith v. Sut-
ton.23 All others lacked some prerequisite: Delivery was incomplete;24
vesting of title was a condition subsequent to the donor's death;25 the
subject was improper for a gift;26 the donor was not capable of making a
gift;" or the donees failed to present clear and convincing evidence of
the donor's intent."
It is submitted that Ohio courts will continue to sustain these gifts
but only if valid in all prerequisites, especially that requiring vesting
of title before the donor's death.
DAVID L. SIMIELE
22. 60 Ohio St. 595 (1899). The case is described in 41 WEEKLY LAW BULLETIN 343
(1899). The court affirmed a court of appeals decision sustaining a gift causa morris. The
lower court permitted a wife to make a gift of all her personal property in contemplation of
death.
23. 11 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 262, affid, 82 Ohio St. 421 (1908). All five judges concurred.
The court of appeals held: "The evidence shows that all the elements of a gift causa mortis
were present in this case." 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) at 263.
24. Phipps v. Hope, 16 Ohio St. 586 (1866); Hammor v. Moore, 8 Ohio St. 239 (1858).
25. Adams v. Fleck, 171 Ohio St. 451, 172 N.E.2d 126 (1961).
26. In Simmons v. Cincinnati Savings Society, 31 Ohio St. 457 (1877), the donor attempted
to give his personal check as a gift causa morris. The check was not presented for payment
until after the donor's death. The court held that the donor's check was not an effective gift for
the amount named therein until it was either paid or accepted for payment before the donor's
death.
27. Koehler v. Koehler, 113 Ohio App. 192, 171 NXE.2d 360 (1960).
28. Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108, 12 N.E. 32 (1887); Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St.
462, 3 N.E. 532 (1885).
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